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Abstract 
There is an urgent demand for privacy-preserving techniques 
capable of supporting compute- and data-intensive (CDI) com- 
puting in the era of big data. Answering to this urgent call are 
secure computing techniques, which have been studied for 
decades. Compare with traditional software-only approaches 
such as homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party com- 
puting, emerging as a more practical solution is the new gen- 
eration of hardware supports for Trusted Execution Environ- 
ments (TEEs). However, none of those existing TEEs can 
truly support CDI computing tasks, as CDI requires high- 
throughput accelerators like GPU and TPU but TEEs  do 
not offer security protection of such accelerators. This pa- 
per present HETEE (Heterogeneous TEE), the first design of 
TEE capable of strongly protecting heterogeneous computing 
with unsecure accelerators. HETEE is uniquely constructed to 
work with today’s servers, and does not require any changes 
for existing commercial CPUs or accelerators. The key idea 
of our design runs security controller as a stand-alone com- 
puting system to dynamically adjust the boundary of between 
secure and insecure worlds through the PCIe switches, render- 
ing the control of an accelerator to the host OS when it is not 
needed for secure computing, and shifting it back when it is. 
The controller is the only trust unit in the system and it runs 
the custom OS and accelerator runtimes, together with the 
encryption, authentication and remote attestation components. 
The host server and other computing systems communicate 
with controller through an in-memory task queue that accom- 
modates the computing tasks offloaded to HETEE, in the 
form of encrypted and signed code and data. Also, HETEE 
offers a generic and efficient programming model to the host 
CPU. We have implemented the HETEE design on a hardware 
prototype system, and evaluated it with large-scale Neural Net- 
works inference and training tasks. Our evaluations show that 
HETEE can easily support such secure computing tasks and 
only incurs a 12.34% throughput overhead for inference and 
9.87% overhead for training on average. 
 
∗ Corresponding author: Rui Hou (hourui@iie.ac.cn) 
1 Introduction 
The explosive growth of the data being collected and ana- 
lyzed has fueled the rapid advance in data-driven technolo- 
gies and applications, which have also brought data privacy 
to the spotlight as never before. A large spectrum of data- 
centric innovations today, ranging from personalized health- 
care, mobile finance to social networking, are under persis- 
tent threats of data breaches, such as Facebook data expo- 
sure [10,11], and the growing pressure for compliance with 
emerging privacy laws and regulations, like GDPR (general 
data protection regulation) and the CCPA (California Con- 
sumer Privacy Act). As a result, there is an urgent demand for 
privacy-preserving techniques capable of supporting compute- 
and data-intensive (CDI) computing, such as training deep 
neural networks (DNNs) over an enormous amount of data. 
Protecting CDI computing. Answering to this urgent call 
are secure computing techniques, which have been studied 
for decades. Traditional software-only approaches such as 
homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computing 
are considered to be less effective in protecting complicated 
computing (such as DNN analysis) over big data, due to their 
significant computation or communication overheads. Emerg- 
ing as a more practical solution is the new generation of hard- 
ware supports for Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) 
such as Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [25], AMD 
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) [24] and ARM Trust- 
Zone [3]. These TEEs are characterized by their separation 
of a secure world, called enclave in SGX, from the insecure 
one, so protected data can be processed by trusted code in 
an enclave, even in the presence of a compromised operating 
system (OS) and corrupted system administrators. 
However, none of those TEEs can truly support CDI com- 
puting tasks, due to their exclusion of high-throughput acceler- 
ators such as graph-processing unit (GPU), tensor-processing 
unit (TPU), field-programmable gate array (FPGA, for build- 
ing custom accelerators) etc. More fundamentally, today’s 
TEEs are not designed to protect big-data analytics, since 
they fail to support the heterogeneous computing model 
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that becomes the mainstream architecture for CDI comput- 
ing [2,9,18,19,22,38,42,43]. Under a heterogeneous architec- 
ture, a CDI computing task is jointly processed by different 
types of computing units , such as CPU, GPUs, cryptographic 
co-processors and others. For example, a machine learning 
task today is typically performed by a CPU, which acts as a 
control unit, and a set of GPUs or TPUs, which serve as com- 
puting units. This collaborative computing model is shown 
to significantly outperform a homogeneous one [19,38]. In 
the meantime, such collaborations need to be under a TEE’s 
protection during secure computing, which has not been con- 
sidered in the current designs1. A related issue is these TEEs’ 
Trusted Computing Base (TCB), whose software and hard- 
ware stacks range from nothing but CPU (Intel SGX), thereby 
forcing a computing task to use OS resources and expose 
itself to side-channel threats, to a generic OS running on mul- 
tiple trusted units (e.g., MMU, DMA and other controllers 
supporting ARM TrustZone, in addition to CPU) with the 
level of complexity that likely introduces vulnerabilities. A 
TEE for CDI computing is expected to strike a balance be- 
tween attack surface reduction and TCB simplification, by 
only managing the resource for computation. 
Recently an attempt has been made to extend TEE protec- 
tion for CDI computing [53], through adding trusted comput- 
ing components to GPU chips. The approach, however, still 
does not support the heterogeneous model. Actually, in order 
to work with CPU, a secure channel needs to be established 
between a CPU enclave and the modified GPU, which is ex- 
posed to side-channel analysis by untrusted OS and incurs 
additional performance overheads. Also, this design requires 
changes to the architectures of GPU chips, such an expensive 
process may also introduce new challenges in establishing 
trust across different vendors’ computing units, when they are 
used together to support a heterogeneous computing task. 
Heterogeneous TEE. We believe that a TEE designed for 
CDI tasks should offer a strong support for heterogeneous 
computing, enabling collaborative computing units to be pro- 
tected under a single enclave and conveniently assigned across 
secure/insecure worlds and different enclaves. Further this 
computation-oriented TEE should only include a small yet 
computing-ready TCB (e.g., a single security controller with 
a software stack customized for supporting CDI tasks), to re- 
duce its complexity and also minimize the side-channel attack 
surface exposed by resource sharing with the untrusted OS. 
For ease of deployment, using existing computing units with- 
out chip-level changes is highly desirable. In this paper, we 
present the first design that meets all these descriptions. Our 
approach, called HETEE (Heterogeneous TEE), is uniquely 
constructed to work with today’s servers. It includes a secu- 
rity controller running on a board connected to the standard 
 
1Note that though theoretically the secure world of TrustZone can be ex- 
tended to peripherals, including a GPU unit, in practice, ARM tends to move 
GPUs outside the protection [3], not to mention proving the trustworthiness 
of a computing task running in the unit through attestation. 
PCI Express (or PCIe) bus, acting as a gatekeeper for a se- 
cure world dedicated to CDI computing. The unit can be built 
using an FPGA board (the FPGA chip embodies ARM pro- 
cessor cores and programmable logics) or a custom board 
with a commodity processor (e.g., X86 processor), and is the 
only unit that needs to be trusted. It runs a thin software stack 
to operate accelerator drivers and computing platforms like 
CUDA, together with secure computing functions like encryp- 
tion/decryption, authentication and attestation (to the data 
holder). All the computing units, like GPUs, AI accelerators, 
etc., are shared between the OS and the security controller. A 
unique design of HETEE is its use of a PCIe switch (such as 
PCIe ExpressFabric series chip produced by Broadcom) to 
dynamically move computing units between the secure world 
under its control and the insecure world managed by the OS. 
The switch also allows the security controller to partition 
the secure world into different enclaves with cross-enclave 
communication under its full mediation. 
A critical issue here is how to trust the computing units also 
used in the insecure world. Our solution leverages the unique 
features of today’s GPU and accelerator designs: most of them 
are tight , fully controlled by firmware and carrying a thin soft- 
ware stack; so they can be “reset” to a trusted status by simply 
cleaning up all their internal storage. Particularly, depending 
on the type and vendor of a computing unit, HETEE either 
utilizes its “hot reset” function to restore it to the clean status 
or runs a program to wipe out all its storage content. We show 
that this simple approach works effectively on mainstream 
units like NVIDIA GPU, Tesla M40 and GTX TITAIN X. In 
this way, HETEE avoid any chip-level changes and can work 
with all existing computing units, and therefore can be easily 
deployed to servers to enable large-scale computing. 
We partially implemented our design on the prototype sys- 
tem which is a X86 host system connected with Xilinx Zynq 
FPGA (acting as the security controller) and NVIDIA GPUs 
over PCIe fabric, and evaluated it with large-scale Neural 
Networks inference and training tasks. Our study shows that 
compared with unprotected computation on GPUs, HETEE 
can easily handle the task involving big data and only in- 
curs a 12.34% throughput overhead for inference and 9.87% 
overhead for training on average. We also discuss how to pro- 
tect the design from physical attacks, using existing tamper- 
resistant techniques. 
Contributions. The contributions of the paper are summa- 
rized as follows: 
First heterogeneous TEE design. We present the first de- 
sign of TEE capable of protecting heterogeneous comput- 
ing, which enables different computing units (CPU, GPU, 
accelerators, etc.) to efficiently work together, without ex- 
posing a large attack surface to untrusted OS. Further, by 
using a PCIe switch and state reset, our design can con- 
veniently and safely move computing units in and out of 
the secure world, effectively compartimentalizing a secure 
• 
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computing task with limited additional resources required 
from current computing systems. 
Ease of deployment and immediate impacts. Our solution 
does not require changes to accelerators’ architectures, 
and can therefore be relatively easy to produce and deploy, 
providing immediate protection to today’s CDI computing. 
Implementation and evaluation. We partially imple- 
mented our design and evaluated it on real-world CDI 
tasks, which demonstrates the effectiveness of our new 
solution. 
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sec- 
tion2is the background; Section3introduces the HETEE 
design and make security analysis; Section4presents the 
performance and cost evaluations on the hardware prototype 
system; Section5discusses the limitations of the current ap- 
proach and potential future research; Section6is the related 
work and Section7concludes the paper. 
 
2 Background 
2.1 Heterogeneous System 
Heterogeneous system has been considered to be a promising 
solution to CDI computing, due to its potentials to achieve 
high performance at a low energy cost. A prominent example 
is the wide adoption of the CPU+GPU combination for the 
computing tasks ranging from machine learning model train- 
ing and inference to the support for automatic driving. Also, 
Google uses its in-house TPU chips for AI acceleration, and 
Microsoft has deployed thousands of FPGAs to speed up its 
Bing search service. Central to such a heterogeneous system 
are its computing units, such as accelerators, which can be 
characterized by the following features: 
Producer-consumer based programming model. Behind 
all kinds of accelerators is the same programming model in 
which the host program running on CPU acts as a consumer 
and the accelerator as a producer. More specifically, the host 
program first prepares the input data for a computing task, 
which could involve copying the data across different memory 
spaces if necessary, before launching an execution kernel or 
an operation command in the accelerator. Then the accelera- 
tor continuously handles the tasks it is given, producing out- 
comes for the host program that keeps on querying for them. 
This program model has been supported by OpenCL [20] and 
CUDA [1]. It also allows us to abstract the accelerator as a sep- 
arate computing unit when designing resource management 
in HETEE. 
PCIe based interconnect protocol. Although new intercon- 
nect protocols to link computing units together have been 
proposed, such as NVIDIA NVLink, ARM CCIX, and IBM 
CAPI, PCIe is still the first or the only  option  for almost 
all commercial high-end heterogeneous computing systems 
(those involving GPUs, FPGAs, or TPUs), due to its exten- 
sive use for connecting devices to CPU. This is critical for 
heterogeneous computing, which is characterized by the in- 
tensive CPU-accelerator interactions. The design of HETEE 
takes full advantage of PCIe and uses a switch to dynamically 
allocate computing units across different secure enclaves. 
Software support for effective CPU-accelerator interac- 
tions. Important to heterogeneous computing is effective 
CPU-accelerator interactions, which are supported by a soft- 
ware stack running on CPU. Taking GPUs as an example, its 
software stack includes GPU drivers, CUDA, and TensorFlow 
or Caffe. Another example is the domain-specific accelerator 
like compression, whose operations are enabled by driver, 
OpenCL etc. Therefore, this software stack brings in compli- 
cated communication between CPU and accelerator, which 
could leak out information once exposed to the untrusted OS, 
even when the communication is encrypted. 
 
2.2 TEE Technologies 
A trusted execution environment (TEE) guarantees the code 
and data loaded inside an isolated area (called an enclave)  
to be protected with respect to confidentiality, integrity and 
authenticity. TEEs aims to thwart sophisticated software ad- 
versaries (e.g. compromised OS) or even hardware adver- 
saries who have physical access to the platform. TEE provides 
hardware-enforced security features including isolated execu- 
tion, protecting the integrity and confidentiality of the enclave, 
along with the ability to authenticate the code running inside 
a trusted platform through attestation: 
Isolation. Data within the enclave cannot be read or modi- 
fied by untrusted parties. 
Integrity. Runtime states should not have been tampered 
with. 
Confidentiality. Code, data and runtime states should not 
have been observable by unauthorized applications. This 
is achieved, e.g. by encrypting the code or data that reside 
in the memory. 
Authentication. The code under execution has been cor- 
rectly instantiated on a trusted platform. To prevent simu- 
lation of hardware with a user-controlled software, a hard- 
ware root of trust burnt into the TEE chip during manufac- 
turing can be used to perform remote attestation. 
Trusted execution environment has been studied for 
decades. Varies of trusted hardware technologies were de- 
signed for specific application scenarios, supporting (some 
of) the above security features. ARM TrustZone is a collec- 
tion of hardware modules that can be used to conceptually 
partition a system’s resources between a secure world, which 
hosts a secure container, and a normal world, which runs an 
untrusted software stack. Intel’s Software Guard Extensions 
(SGX) implements secure containers for applications without 
making any modifications to the processor’s critical execution 
path. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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2.3 PCIe Switch Fabric 
PCIe ExpressFabric (switch) is an important interconnect 
technique for achieving cost-effectiveness in today’s data 
center. This technique is leveraged in our design of HETEE, 
which to our best knowledge, has never been done before. 
Unlike PCI that uses a shared bus architecture, PCIe has  
a point-to-point topology, using the switch chips to dynam- 
ically route packets of data between a PCIe host (e.g., root 
complex connected to the CPU and the memory subsystem) 
and multiple devices (e.g., GPUs, TPUs). This enables flex- 
ible sharing of IO among multiple devices, and also allows 
multiple hosts to reside on a single PCIe-based network us- 
ing standard PCIe enumeration. These hosts communicate 
through the Ethernet-like DMA with each other and standard 
end-points, through unmodified applications. The PCIe switch 
can be hot-swapped and power cycled in any order, providing 
real plug and play for devices. Besides the capabilities of 
the IO sharing within multiple hosts and high performance 
host-to-host and host-to-IO DMA, the PCIe ExpressFabric 
also has two unique features important to our design: 
Software-defined fabric. The switch is built on a hybrid 
hardware/software platform that offers high configurability 
and flexibility with regards to the number of hosts, end-points, 
and PCIe slots. Its critical pathways have direct hardware 
support, enabling the fabric to offer non-blocking, line speed 
performance with features such as IO sharing. The chip has 
a dedicated port for management, through which an external 
management CPU (mCPU) can initialize the switch, configure 
its routing tables, handle errors, Hot-Plug events, and others. 
In this way, all the hosts connected by the switch only see 
what the mCPU allows them to see. 
Flexible topologies. The switch eliminates the topology re- 
strictions of PCIe. Usually, PCI Express networks must be 
arranged in a hierarchical topology, with a single path from 
one point to another. ExpressFabric allows other topologies 
such as mesh, IO Expansion Box with Multiple hosts, and 
many others. 
 
2.4 Threat Model 
(Privileged) Software adversary. HETEE defends against 
the adversary with full control of the software stack in the 
insecure world, including unprivileged software running on 
the host, the host OS, virtual machine monitor, the initial boot 
code and system management mode. Such an adversary can 
also mount a side channel attack e.g. analyzing network traf- 
fic. The design of HETEE greatly reduces the surfaces of the 
attack, compared with SGX, exposing nothing but the total 
computing time of a task or the interval between encrypted 
data uploads (from the hard drive to the secure world). How- 
ever, a thorough analysis of the leaks is left for the future 
research. We assume that the system software of the security 
controller is trusted. 
Hardware adversary. HETEE defends against the adversary 
who has physical access to the platform. Without dedicated 
tamper-resistant mechanism, the hardware adversary might 
mount code boot attacks or snooping attacks on the host mem- 
ory bus and the PCIe bus. Thus, we assume the hardware 
implementation of HETEE to be tamper-resistant, which can 
be achieved using the techniques discussed in Section3.7. Be- 
sides, we do not consider electromagnetic or power analysis, 
and fault attacks. 
We also assume that accelerators are directly controlled by 
their firmware, as happened in today’s mainstream GPUs, like 
those produced by NVIDIA [39]. In this case, malicious code 
running on an accelerator cannot stop a reset operation com- 
manded through a trusted driver and the firmware, which will 
return the accelerator to a trusted state (Section 3). Finally, we 
consider that the under the fundamental reset or cold reboot, 
the firmware on an accelerator (such as GPU) can ensure that 
all micro-architecture statuses, including those of caches and 
memory, are cleared. 
Others. We use standard encryption algorithms. As such 
any cryptanalysis attempts are out of scope. So are denial- 
of-Service attacks, since they are trivial to launch for the 
adversary who controls the entire host platform. 
 
3 HETEE Design 
In this section, we elaborate the design and security analysis 
of HETEE. 
 
3.1 Overview 
 
Figure 1: HETEE architecture. 
Design goals and principles. HETEE is a computation- 
oriented TEE designed to achieve the following goals: 
Strong isolation. We expect that HETEE provides strong 
isolation both between secure/insecure worlds and be- 
tween the enclaves that run different computing tasks. 
The isolation should be enforced not only logically but 
also physically to minimize the interface of the protected 
computing task exposed to the unauthorized party (e.g., a 
different computing task). 
Flexible resource sharing. We expect that different com- 
puting units (accelerators) can be dynamically allocated to 
• 
• 
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a computing task under protection (running inside an en- 
clave). They should also be moved between the secure/in- 
secure worlds during runtime without undermining the 
protection of sensitive data and computing tasks. 
Thin TCB. The TCB of HETEE system should be as thin 
as possible. Computing-unrelated components should be 
removed from its software stack. On the hardware side, 
only the security controller should be trusted. 
Sytem-level implementation. HETEE should be imple- 
mented on the system level, built upon existing accelera- 
tors, without changes to the commodity chips, which is 
critical for the technique’s easy deployment. 
Architecture. Here we present the first design for achieving 
the aforementioned goals, as illustrated in Figure1. At the 
center of the design is a trusted security controller unit that 
manages a set of PCIe switches attached to a host server. 
The server runs on standard, commercial hardware with a 
standard OS, and the user-land programs supporting HETEE. 
Controller operates outside the untrusted OS, on top of its 
own software stack custom to CDI computing protection. 
Also connected to its PCIe switches are a set of computing 
units – accelerators. 
Security controller and the accelerators (which are com- 
mercial, unmodified computing units) are encapsulated into 
a tamper-resistant box, which is connected to the host server 
through the PCIe switches. However, logically, only controller 
is considered trusted. Itself and the computing units under its 
protection form the secure world, and all other components 
(the host and unprotected units) constitutes the insecure world. 
Note that the accelerators are shared across these two worlds 
and only trusted when they are sanitized (through reset) and 
under the control of security controller. 
The key idea  of our design  runs  security  controller  as 
a stand-alone computing system to dynamically adjust the 
boundary of between secure and insecure worlds through 
the PCIe switches, rendering the control of an accelerator  
to the host OS when it is not needed for secure computing, 
and shifting it back when it is. To this end, we need to trust 
the custom OS and accelerator runtimes, drivers, etc. operat- 
ing in controller, together with its encryption, authentication 
and remote attestation components. The host server and other 
computing systems communicate with controller through an 
in-memory task queue that accommodate the computing tasks 
offloaded to HETEE, in the form of task containing encrypted 
and signed code/binary or data. Also, we offer a generic and 
efficient programming interface for the host system, and a 
secure encrypted communication mechanism. 
A remote user uses the remote attestation to verify the 
security of an accelerator. The main part of an offloading 
application runs on the CPU. It accepts the protection of a 
CPU TEE (e.g. Intel SGX), or its sensitive code and data 
exists in encrypted form. When the application needs to use 
an accelerator, it writes the code and data according to the 
agreed programming model, and sends these key data and task 
instructions to the security controller in ciphertext. These 
ciphertext are decrypted and parsed, and the tasks will be 
scheduled by a predetermined policy. The security controller 
prepares task-relevant data to the accelerator, and runs spec- 
ified task commands to direct it to work until the result is 
retrieved, encrypted, and transmitted to the CPU application. 
Taking the NVIDIA GPU as an example, a CPU offloading 
application encrypts and signs the CUDA code and data and 
sends it to the task queue. The security controller decrypts 
and verifies these ciphertext on the trusted OS. Then, it runs 
CUDA codes locally and pass the data to the GPU for process- 
ing. Finally, the processing result is encrypted and copied to 
the target area of the CPU memory space specified by the task, 
and the CPU application is notified for further processing. 
 
3.2 Security Controller 
As a separate system, security controller runs on a board 
connected to the standard PCI fabric, acting as a gatekeeper 
for a secure world dedicated to CDI computing. It is the 
only unit that needs to be trusted. It runs a thin software 
stack to operate accelerator drivers and computing platforms 
like CUDA, together with secure computing functions like 
encryption/decryption, authentication and attestation (to the 
data holder). 
Software. Linux is customized as trusted OS running on 
security controller, and the task level isolation is based on 
the existing container mechanism. Application-layer software 
mainly includes the following functions: 
Task manager: It is in charge of the task queue manage- 
ment, execution environment initialization, task parsing 
and dispatching etc. 
Security task encryption/decryption, authentication and 
remote attestation: the controller can establish an en- 
crypted secure channel with the data holder through the 
intrusted host OS and collect measurement of a computing 
task to be performed on sensitive data in an enclave. 
Accelerator runtime and driver. These components are 
unmodified and operate just like in a normal OS. 
Accelerator security mode switch. Security controller is 
also the mCPU for PCIe ExpressFabirc chip of HETEE, 
which can dynamically configure PCIe fabric switching 
accelerators between secure and insecure worlds. 
Hardware. The security controller is a stand-alone comput- 
ing system, with its separate CPU, memory and disk2. It also 
has necessary hardware supports for secure boot. Here are the 
requirements for the hardware: 
The security controller should have good single-threaded 
performance and throughput capability. 
 
 
2Here the disk could be shared with the untrusted OS in the presence of 
an interface built in the OS of the secure world. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Figure 2: Task queue and software stacks on host and security controller. 
 
Its CPU should have strong IO bandwidth and processing 
capacity; 
Hardware acceleration engine for encryption and decryp- 
tion and hash algorithms are expected. 
In our research, we built the security controller on Xil- 
inx ZC706 FPGA as a proof-of-concept for evaluating our 
designs for different HETEE components. A full-fledged im- 
plementation can customize PCB board with X86 processor 
and (or) FPGA chip, so that provides more computing power 
and effective supports for managing different accelerators. 
 
3.3 Task Queue and Secure Programming In- 
terfaces 
Compared with the classical heterogeneous computing sys- 
tem, HETEE System introduces one more  address  space 
for the security controller. Having multiple address spaces 
presents a challenge for the design of programming interface. 
In addition, HETEE needs to provide a concise, generic pro- 
gramming interface that accepts security computing requests 
and data from remote or local hosts, and unifies them into 
HETEE enclave. It is important to note that this programming 
interface is completely independent on the CPU’s TEE. More 
precisely, HETEE constructs a unified enclave for all compute 
units to be protected, including CPUs and accelerators. 
We propose a task-based programming interface for 
HETEE system. This model divides the entire life-cycle of 
using the accelerator into three components: configuration 
task, command task, and data task. 
Configuration task: Host program sends the configuration 
task to the security controller to request the assignment 
of a new task queue, including the type and number of 
accelerators. Task manager assigns a uniform task ID to 
each procedure of using an accelerator. 
Command task: This type of task is primarily used to 
transfer programs to be executed on the security controller, 
which may be CUDA codes, or OpenCL programs, or other 
program code based on the accelerator API. To ensure the 
confidentiality and integrity, these codes are encrypted and 
signed before being encapsulated as a command task. 
• Data task: This type of task is used to transmit sensitive 
data. These data may be encrypted inside the CPU TEE, 
or placed directly on the host hard disk in the encrypted 
form, or come from a remote user. 
As shown in Figure2, a set of task queues are provided be- 
tween the security controller and the host CPU to support the 
task-based programming interface. The task queue is a mem- 
ory data structure that belongs to the security controller space 
and is mapped into the host memory space by the standard 
PCIe protocol. We assign a task queue for each procedure of 
using the accelerator, in which all commands and data tasks 
have the same task ID and are fully sequenced (order are kept). 
These tasks are sent by the local or remote users, stored in the 
task queue, and processed by the task manager in the security 
controller. 
 
(a) Example pseudo code running on the host. 
 
 
(b) Example pseudo code which is transmitted in term of command task 
and run on the security controller to use secure accelerators. 
Figure 3: Example pseudo code to use HETEE 
Host Security Controller 
Host invisible 
Accelerators 
Host visible 
Untrusted Local Local 
Networks Host App Host App 
#1 
    
Accelerator #1 
#2 
HETEE Service 
Proxy 
#3 
Task Manager 
（parser,dispatcher,controller） 
Fra e orks Fra e orks 
Accelerator #2 
Ru tim  Ru tim  
Accelerator #3 
HETEE 
Driver 
Secure boot 
Remote 
Attestation 
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key    
Agreement 
Container Container 
Driver 
Remote user 
#Check if remote attestation between remote user and 
#HETEE is finished 
res = CheckIfRemoteAttestationSucceed(); 
IF res is True: 
commandTask = ReceiveCommandTaskFromRemoteUser(); 
WHILE True: 
#Insecurity Part 
computeOnUntrustedAccelerator(localNonPrivateData); 
#Security Part 
SendCommandTaskToHETEE(commandTask); 
#Encrypted private data is already stored on Host 
dataTask = Package(localEncryptedPrivateData); 
SendDataTaskToHETEE(dataTask); 
results = RecieveDataTaskResults(); 
END WHILE 
END IF 
INPUT: InBuffer, OutBuffer, Accelerators 
 
InitDevice(Accelerators); 
AllocateDeviceBuffer(Accelerators); 
WHILE True: 
#Call Get API to get data from InBuffer 
data = Get(InBuffer,size); 
IF data is not empty: 
CopyDataToDevice(data, Accelerators); 
#Normal way to use Accelerators 
ComputeOnDevice(Accelerators); 
results = CopyDataFromDevice(Accelerators); 
#Call Put API to put computing results to OutBuffer 
Put(OutBuffer,results); 
END IF 
END WHILE 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Figure3(a)describes an example of a typical host pro- 
gram using the task model to securely use an accelerator. If a 
trusted remote user wants to run an application on HETEE, 
he should send a configuration task to the security controller. 
The task manager then allocates a new task queue to the user 
and notifies the user when the task queue is ready. Once the 
establishment of the task queue is completed, the remote user 
encrypts the command (i.e.,AI model), packs the ciphertext 
into a command task, and put it into the task queue. The task 
manager fetches ciphertexts from the task queue, verifies the 
integrity of the messages, then decrypts and parses them. If 
the parsed task is a command, task manager will initiate a 
corresponding process (i.e.,Tensorflow program) to execute 
the command. At the same time, input and output buffers are 
created for the process. When the task manager detects a new 
data task, it dispatches the task to the corresponding process 
input buffers. After its data is processed by accelerator, the 
process places the computing result in the output buffer. Task 
manager is also responsible for scanning the output buffer, 
encrypting the contents, send them back to the host memory 
through the DMA engine in term of data task. Then host 
server returns the encrypted results to the remote user. When 
the application finished, the remote user sends back a notifica- 
tion to acknowledge the security controller. Finally, the task 
manager destroys the task queues and terminates the process. 
A command task contains the source codes or the corre- 
sponding binary executable file. HETEE provides a set of 
debugging and development environments similar to tradi- 
tional heterogeneous computing for users to write this part 
of the code, and then encapsulate the source codes or the ex- 
ecutable file into a command task as needed. It is important 
to note that these codes are built on the runtime and drivers 
on real accelerators, and should be executed on the security 
controller. Figure3(b)describes the pseudo source codes 
corresponding to a typical command task. First, the process 
initializes accelerators and allocates device buffers for data. 
Then, the process loads new data from the input buffer, and 
moving them into the memory space of the accelerator. Then, 
the computing kernel is launched. After the execution, the 
result is copied from the accelerators to the output buffer. The 
above operations are iterated until the end of a task. 
 
3.4 Computing Isolation and Elasticity 
Shown in Figure4, HETEE provides strong isolation between 
secure/insecure worlds and the enclaves that run different 
computing tasks. It achieves isolation mainly through the 
following techniques: 
The network composed by PCIe ExpressFabric Chip is 
used as the centric interconnection hub of the system. The 
Security controller, the host, and the accelerators are all 
connected via the PCIe ExpressFabric, which enables the 
physical isolation. The ExpressFabric chip can support di- 
rect communication between the host and the security con- 
troller, and can also allocate shared accelerator resources 
between secure/insecure world and across different en- 
claves in the secure world. Thus the controller just acts as 
a gatekeeper, and a proxy for the host system to access the 
accelerators in the secure world. 
The only interface between the controller and the host is 
the task queue, which communicates in the format and 
protocol described in Section 3.3. This simple mechanism 
minimizes the interface of the protected computing task 
exposed to the unauthorized host. The host and the security 
controller essentially belong to the two separate systems 
connected to the ExpressFabric chip. In order to enable the 
host to access the task queue belonging to the controller 
space, it is necessary to map the addresses of task queues 
into the space of the host. ExpressFabirc is responsible 
for routing and translating the address across different 
memory spaces via recording the mapping relations. The 
two sides can then use the high-performance Host-to-host 
DMA engine embedded in the ExpressFabric chip for high 
bandwidth and low latency data transfers. 
The security controller provides a container-based protec- 
tion mechanism within its trusted OS to isolate different 
enclaves that run different computing tasks. It further en- 
hances the isolation effect within the trusted OS. 
A key design of the HETEE system is to take full advantage 
of the functionality of the software-defined network provided 
by the PCIe ExpressFabric chip. In other words, security 
controller dynamically allocates shared IO devices between 
the host and the controller through the mCPU management 
port of the ExpressFabric chip, defining and managing the 
boundaries of the secure world based on the predefined policy. 
This achieves the elasticity in computing in the following two 
perspectives. 
(1) Elastic accelerator allocation in secure world 
Multiple accelerators form an accelerator resource pool, 
which can make a good trade-off between cost and utiliza- 
tion [13]. HETEE only allows multiple tasks to timing-share 
accelerators, rather than multiple tasks concurrently running 
on them. Coupled with our context cleaning mechanism, such 
a design can minimize side-channel leakages across tasks. 
At the same time, HETEE permits a task to dynamically use 
multiple accelerators for better performance based on task 
requirements and load conditions. When a user needs to uti- 
lize the accelerator resource, a request is sent to the security 
controller, which dynamically allocates a certain amount of 
accelerator resources to the user according to the usage in the 
resource pool and the user’s demand. Data and control com- 
mands from the user are assigned by the security controller 
to a set of accelerators, and the user sees only one virtual 
accelerator. The number of accelerators assigned to user can 
be dynamically adjusted by the security controller. 
(2) Elastic accelerator mode switch across secure/inse- 
cure world 
• 
• 
• 
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Figure 4: Accelerator resources isolation and elastic switch across secure/insecure world 
 
In order to utilize the data center accelerator resources 
more efficiently, it is necessary to dynamically allocate the 
accelerators to different users, which might involve switching 
the accelerator across secure/insecure worlds. By dynami- 
cally configuring the ExpressFabric chip, an accelerator can 
be physically assigned to the host or the security controller 
on-demand, thus enabling the switching of the accelerator 
security mode. With this feature, HETEE dynamically de- 
fines the boundary of the secure world. To avoid the security 
risks from the data and code on the accelerator switched be- 
tween different worlds, HETEE utilizes context clearance to 
restore the device to a trusted state. The detail is described in 
Section3.5. 
To support the security mode switching of accelerators, we 
have designed a preemptive accelerator scheduling mecha- 
nism based on priority. A secure switching service needs to 
be run on the security controller. In the meantime, the host 
can request the controller to release some of the accelerator 
resources from the secure world through the configuration 
task or an out-of-band request. The security switching service 
can also send high-priority requests to host, forcing a halt to 
the tasks performed by the accelerator in the insecure world, 
and take them dynamically back to the secure world. 
 
3.5 Context Cleanup on Mode Switch 
Prior studies have  found  that  incomplete  cleanup  during 
a context switch exposes a large attack surface to adver- 
saries [26,27,29,34,36,39 –41,59]. Taking GPU chips as 
examples, Maurice et al. [36] demonstrated five different 
cleanup methods in virtualized environment, four of which 
still leaked sensitive data in the global memory. Therefore, 
a full and efficient context cleanup needs to be deployed to 
ensure the security protection of HETEE. 
The complete context of an application includes not only 
 
Table 1: The overhead of different context cleanup methods on 
NVIDIA TITAN X GPU. (LoM:Local memory, ShM: shared 
memory, GlM:global memory) 
 
Context Cleanup Method Time Cost Clear Size 
 
API 
cudaDeviceReset 71ms 
Resources of 
current process 
cuCtxDestroy 53ms 
Resources of 
current context 
Software 
Reboot 
nvidia-smi -r 975ms 
LoM/ShM/GlM, 
others are unknown 
 
 
Code 
Registers 0.019ms 24 × 65536 × 4B 
LoM 50ms 24 × 1024 × 512KB 
ShM 0.020ms 24 × 96KB 
GlM 44ms 12GB 
L1 Cache 0.019ms 24 × 48KB 
L2 Cache 0.040ms 3MB 
Cold 
Reboot 
Power off ~minutes All 
 
the architectural, but also the micro-architectural states. Since 
implementations vary from vendor to vendor, the context 
includes, but is not limited to, the following contents. 
Architectural states: the register files, on-chip scratchpad 
and memory, as well as off-chip memories. 
Micro-architectural states: on-chip caches, queues, and 
buffers etc. 
However, it is noted that existing cleanup and reset mecha- 
nisms for commercial accelerators or GPUs usually cannot 
eliminate the risk of information leakage. In pursuit of perfor- 
mance, accelerator vendors usually provide quick reset and 
cleanup methods, which leave behind confidential context 
that pose a significant security risk [34]. In addition, some 
software invisible micro-architectures may be used to acceler- 
ate the processes [34,39,41], which indicates that software 
methods cannot clean up these resources. 
As a case study, we investigate 4 cleanup approaches in- 
Security 
Controller 
Core Core Core 
Host PCIe ExpressFabric 
APP 1 
Accelerator 
Secure 
World 
ExpressFabric  ExpressFabric 
Chip Chip 
Accelerator 
ExpressFabric  ExpressFabric 
Chip Chip 
APP 2 
Insecure 
Accelerator World 
System Bus 
Core 
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cluding software reboot, cold reboot, reset API and manually 
coded programs on latest NVIDIA GPU platforms with TI- 
TAN X and Maxwell architecture. Table1shows that cold 
reboot is the most effective but time-consuming method. A 
compromise is to combine the manual cleanup methods with 
API functions, which clean most of known context contents 
within acceptable time. A more thorough context cleanup 
requires the support of the hardware vendors. Fortunately, 
starting from Maxwell GPUs, NVIDIA introduces new mech- 
anisms to strengthen security, and our experiments show TI- 
TAN X has good security features to be used during context 
switching. 
Besides GPU, many accelerators are domain-specific and 
are designed into ASIC chips. Despite the wide variety of 
designs, the current designs of high-performance accelerators 
generally use multiple instances and shared On-chip caches. 
A thorough context cleanup needs to be fully considered. 
 
 
3.6 Trust Establishment and Key Agreement 
 
Secure boot. A secure boot scheme can be integrated to secu- 
rity controller to guarantee that it is running as expected. The 
firmware checks the signature of the boot software, including 
firmware drivers and the system software, and gives control 
to the system software only if the signatures are valid. 
Remote attestation. A pivotal component of TEE is attest- 
ing to a remote data owner that a trusted software has been 
correctly instantiated on a trusted platform. We assume that a 
root secret (i.e. the private signing key) is burned into the e- 
fuses of the chip during the manufacturing process. We do not 
restrict on the choices of signing algorithms, however a Direct 
Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [5] protocol (e.g. EPID [6] 
used in Intel SGX) is necessary such that a device could prove 
to an external party without exposing the device identity. 
The attestation process begins with the platform establish- 
ing a communication channel with the data owner who wishes 
to provision secret. Then the data owner sends an attestation 
request in the form of a randomly generated nonce. In the 
design of HETEE, only the measurement of the firmware as 
well as the system software is generated, since the state of ac- 
celerators is cleaned up upon a task switch. The measurement 
and the nonce along with the quote signed with the private 
signing key are sent back to the data owner. The data owner 
can verify the correctness of the signature and measurement. 
Authenticated key agreement. A key agreement protocol 
(typically the Diffie-Hellman Key Exhange (DKE) [37]) can 
be integrated with remote attestation. It can be assured that a 
shared secret is established with a specific piece of software 
running on a trusted hardware. The shared secret will be used 
to encrypt the secret data for the data owner. 
3.7 Security Analysis 
In this section we present preliminary analysis of the security 
properties provided by HETEE. 
Protection against privileged software adversaries. When 
configured as secure devices, the accelerators are registered to 
the address space of the security controller and are invisible to 
the host system. As such, HETEE enables physical isolation 
between the secure and insecure world, so that the privileged 
software adversary cannot directly access or tamper with the 
accelerators. 
Protection against physical adversaries. HETEE environ- 
ments are deployed in data center, but their administrators 
and operators are not trusted in our threat model. Even though 
the security controller, PCIe switches and accelerators are 
inside the same server blade, they are still subject to possi- 
ble physical attacks. For instance, attacker might (in theory) 
observe the plain-text communication between security con- 
troller and accelerators in secure world, by using PCIe Logic 
analyzer to collect signals inside PCB. Thus it is necessary 
to build HETEE system with physical tamper resistance. Sev- 
eral mature techniques can be introduced in the design of 
HETEE. 
Rack/Server/Adapter Enclosure. Data centers often use 
flexible locking systems to manage access rights through 
flexible implementation methods, providing high reli- 
ability and high security. Combined with RFID  read-  
ers [16], digital keypads [15], or fingerprint identification 
devices [14], access rights can be identified through a 
standalone locking system or a centralized network man- 
agement system [47]. 
Protection Layer. A protection layer is added to original 
circuits to prevent attackers from inspecting directly and 
reverse engineering. There are a variety of materials that 
can be used to implement the protective layer of the circuit, 
such as wire mesh [8], and doped circuits [4]. 
Self-destruction. There are various research works propos- 
ing self-destruction methods to protect circuits from 
unwanted or unauthorized accesses. Tamper protection 
mesh [54] can be employed to recognize theses malicious 
accesses, such as opening the chassis or destroying protec- 
tion layer [28]. Once detecting inspection, existing power 
supply [44] or offline power circuit [35] can be used to pro- 
vide large current to destroy fusible circuits. Furthermore, 
electrically-conductive, self-destruct metal oxide films can 
burn the whole circuits when they are ignited [46]. 
Reducing attack surfaces against the security controller. 
The security controller and the software running on it consists 
of the trusted computing base. HETEE is designed to reduce 
the attack surface of the security controller: 
Controlled programming interfaces. The programming 
interface is defined as task description and task queues. 
The format of tasks is predefined to avoid software attacks 
• 
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such as buffer overflow attacks. The tasks are parsed and 
processed on the accelerators and are unlikely to lead to 
privilege escalation on the security controller. 
Cutting down the code base. The software of the security 
controller is customized. It only needs to support limited 
hardware accelerators. 
Controlling side channels. In the design of HETEE the 
states of accelerators are cleared upon mode switches and 
task switches. This reduces shared resources between the 
insecure world and secure world, as well as among tasks. 
 
4 Implementation and Evaluation 
4.1 Prototype System and AI Workloads 
4.1.1 Prototype System 
 
 
Table 2: HETEE prototype system. 
 
GPU server with HETEE Configuration 
 
Host 
SuperMicro GPU Server mother 
board (SYS-4029GP-TRT2), 
dual-socket Intel Xeon E5- 
2630v4 CPU, 512GB memory, 
16TB Disk 
PCIe fabric 
PCIe Switch chips for IO expan- 
sion (transparent bridge) 
 
 
Security Controller 
FPGA system (Xilinx ZC706, 
which contains on-chip 
600MHz ARM Cortex  A9  
dual cores, and 218.6K LUT, 
437.2K FF programmable 
logics @100MHz) 
Heterogeneous units 4 GPUs (NVIDIA Tesla M40) 
 
The hardware platform includes a host CPU, a PCIe fabric, 
a security controller and several heterogeneous units. The 
detailed configuration is shown in Table2. The Host CPU 
connects to the security controller and four GPUs via a PCIe 
Switch chip. The security controller’s implementation is the 
significance of our prototype system. The security controller 
includes two major functionalities. 
Security verification, task encryption and decryption, task 
analysis and queue management. This part of the function 
mainly runs on the ZC706 FPGA chip. The ZC706 embeds 
an ARM Cortex A9 dual-core processor, where we run Linux 
as the secure OS of the security controller. All task requests 
are decrypted, parsed and dispatched within the Secure OS. In 
order to improve the efficiency of security authentication and 
en-decryption, we implemented the AES-GCM en-decryption 
coprocessor in the programmable logic part (PL side) of the 
ZC706. In addition, an efficient DMA engine is integrated for 
data transfer between host and ZC706 (Task communications 
between the Host CPU and the security controller ). 
Tensorflow, CUDA library and GPU driver. In the HETEE 
design, software stack of accelerator needs to be run in the 
trusted OS on security controller. In our prototype system, 
the ARM Cortex A9 processor of the ZC706 runs a Linux 
kernel. We did not find corresponding version of GPU driver 
and CUDA runtime for this configuration. Therefore, the pro- 
totype system did some tricky design. After the ZC706 de- 
crypts and verifies the task sent from the host CPU, the data 
is transmitted back, and the GPU software stack including 
Tensorflow, CUDA library and GPU driver running on the 
host CPU are responsible for using the GPU. This implemen- 
tation is appropriate since our prototype system is used for 
performance evaluation. Specifically, this implementation is 
more conservative than real HETEE in performance because 
of the extra FPGA-to-CPU communications. 
In addition, the prototype system uses a PCIe transparent 
bridge as the interconnection center to connect the CPU, GPU 
and FPGA. The PCIe transparent bridge is a subset of the Ex- 
press Fabric chip. Because the embedded ARM A9 processor 
of the FPGA can act as both a slave and a master, the proto- 
type system does not require the newest PCIe Express Fabric 
chip for performance evaluation experiments. In terms of per- 
formance, the PCIe transparent bridge’s latency is basically 
the same as the PCIe ExpressFabric chip, thus the prototype 
system can meet the performance evaluation requirements. 
We are designing a HETEE hardware system based on a PCIe 
ExpressFabric chip, which is currently in the PCB production 
stage. 
 
4.1.2 AI workloads 
We selected 6 classic neural networks, all of which almostly 
obtained the best classification results at that time on the large- 
scale image classification dataset ImageNet [21,30,45,48] 
and have been widely used in scientific research and industries. 
The number of layers in these networks are ranged between 8 
and 152, with the number of parameters between 5 Million 
and 138 Million. Our choice is a good cover for typical neural 
networks from small scale to large scale. At the same time, we 
selected three different batch sizes as network inputs for each 
deep learning network to observe the impacts of input data 
of different sizes on the throughtput and latency of HETEE 
system. Table3describes the details of each network model. 
 
4.2 Performance Evaluation 
Compared to normal heterogeneous calculations, HETEE sys- 
tem introduces longer task (data and command) transfer paths, 
additional encryption and decryption and task processing 
work. This section mainly evaluates the throughput of the 
HETEE hardware prototype system running a set of deep 
• 
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Table 3: AI workloads. 
 
Model Parameters Layers 
Size of each 
image 
Classes 
AlexNet [30] 60 Million 8 227x227x3 1K 
VGG16 [45] 138 Million 16 224x224x3 1K 
GoogLeNet [48] 5 Million 22 224x224x3 1K 
ResNet50 [21] 25 Million 50 224x224x3 1K 
ResNet101 [21] 44 Million 101 224x224x3 1K 
ResNet152 [21] 60 Million 152 224x224x3 1K 
 
learning network, and the latency of single-batch image rea- 
soning (inference), as well as its scalability. 
Baseline: Normal unprotected GPU server is selected as 
the baseline, which has the same configurations with HETEE 
system (same CPU, memory, chipsets and GPU). 
ModelName_Batchsize: the naming rule for AI network 
loads is ModelName_Batchsize. For example, VGG16_b32 
means this network load use VGG16 model and its batch size 
is 32. 
 
4.2.1 Throughput and latency evaluation on single GPU 
in Figure5(the results of the HETEE are normalized to base- 
line). It can be observed that the HETEE throughput overhead 
is 12.34% for network inference and 9.87% for network train- 
ing on average. As can be found from our evaluation, the 
batch size is an important factor that affects  performance. 
In general, the appropriate increment of batch size can com- 
pensate for the overhead of task encapsulation, transmission, 
and processing. For most of network loads in training sce- 
narios, their throughput can take benefits from larger batch 
size. This phenomenon is more stable in the training scenario. 
The reason is that computation in training is usually more 
intensive than inference. On the other hand, larger batch size 
means better bandwidth utilization. Balanced data transfer 
and processing usually lead to better throughput. 
However, for other cases like VGG16 (inference), when 
batch size is increased from 16 to 32, bandwidth loss is posi- 
tively correlated with data transfer time. When batch size is 
from 32 to 64, the GPU computing time becomes longer. At 
this time, the performance bottleneck is mainly the comput- 
ing power of the GPU, the time of data transmission is partly 
obscured by GPU operation time, and thus the bandwidth loss 
is reduced. 
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Figure 6: HETEE Latency of one inference task on a single 
GPU. 
Figure6describes the latency and breakdown of the 
HETEE system for one inference of deep learning networks. 
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(b) Training 
Figure 5: HETEE throughput evaluation on a single GPU. 
The throughput evaluation of the HETEE system is shown 
As can be seen, the latency of the HETEE system increases 
by an average of 121.4% compared to the baseline  sys-  
tem (baseline latency is the sum of GPU_compute and 
Data_preprocessing). Latency breakdown can help us with 
further analysis. First, a portion of the delay is unavoidable 
because the HETEE system introduces additional data trans- 
fer paths (including Host_send_task, Host_receive_result), 
as well as task parsing (part of Task_processing). Secondly, 
because of the limitations of our experimental platform, the 
ARM processor on the FPGA cannot run CUDA, and tasks 
need to be transferred between the FPGA and the CPU (in- 
cluding Internal_task_copy, Internal_result_copy). This part 
occupies the 14.6% of the total time on average. The real 
HETEE system can completely avoid this part of the cost. 
Finally, part of the time is spent on task transfer and wait 
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between multiple queues (Task_processing). This part can be 
further optimized by introducing a faster interrupt mechanism. 
 
4.2.2 Scalability evaluation 
The HETEE system supports the elastic allocation of accel- 
erator resources. Multiple accelerators can be dynamically 
assigned to speedup the same enclave. Table4shows the 
scalability of HETEE. Two main conclusions can be drawn: 
(1) The elastic resource allocation mechanism of HETEE has 
good scalability. For most workloads, multiple GPUs achieve 
acceleration compared to a single GPU. Overall, the aver- 
age acceleration ratio of 2GPUs relative to a single GPU is 
1.51 on average, and 4GPUs acceleration is 2.16 on average; 
(2) HETEE does not affect its scalability compared to the 
baseline GPU Server. Taken ResNet152 as an example, the 
scalability of the HETEE system remains essentially the same 
as the baseline system. In addition, we also observed that for 
AlexNet-b16 and GoogLeNet-b16 network, the performance 
of 4GPUs is even worse than the performance of 2GPUs. This 
is mainly because of the GPU computing time is too short, 
and that the traffic between multiple GPUs and CPU is easy 
to cause GPU starving. 
 
4.3 Cost Evaluation 
In this section, we use several mainstream commercial GPUs 
as examples to analyze the cost of HETEE. We choose an 
Intel Xeon E5-2600 processor as the security controller con- 
sidering its IO bandwidth and performance, with reference 
to the configuration of the commercial GPU server [50]. The 
cost of HETEE comes mainly from the newly added security 
controller system, as well as the PCIe switch chip(s). HETEE 
is primarily used to connect multiple accelerators and to form 
a relatively independent system with them. Therefore, when 
we make the cost assessment, we mainly pay attention to the 
ratio between the security related modules (secure controller 
and PCIe switch chip(s), etc.) and accelerator cost. 
Figure7presents the result of our hardware cost analysis. 
We enumerate the cost ratio of HETEE of different quantities 
and types of GPUs. Because that there are 97 lanes in each 
PCIe Switch chip, one chip can only connect up to 5 GPUs 
(x16). When more GPUs are connected to PCIe fabric, the 
number of switch chips will increase accordingly. For exam- 
ple, integrating 8 GPUs needs two PCIe switch chips and a 
security controller. The corresponding PCB cost also needs 
to be doubled. In this 8-GPU configuration, the total cost of 
HETEE is $2779. 
It can be seen the relative cost of HETEE decreases as 
the cost of GPU increases. Considering that a large number 
of GPU devices are usually deployed in a data center, it’s 
obvious that the cost of HETEE is much lower than that of 
GPUs. 
 
 
Figure 7: HETEE hardware cost analysis. (Security Con- 
troller: $999 [49], PCB: $300, Tesla V100: $8699 [51], Tesla 
P40 $4999 [51], Tesla M40: $5099 [51], Tesla P4: $2049 [51], 
PCIe Switch Chip: $590 [7]) 
 
 
5 Discussion 
 
From off-chip to on-chip security controller. Existing 
HETEE design considers maximizing compatibility with ex- 
isting CPU and accelerator chips, and CPU and security con- 
troller interconnect via off-chip PCIe Expressfabric. However, 
heterogeneous architectures are also widely used inside SOC 
chips, such as many application processors or high-end chips 
that integrate a variety of accelerator in the chip. One of the 
main differences between on-chip and off-chip heterogeneous 
architectures is the different interconnect buses. Heteroge- 
neous SOC chips mainly use AXI or other bus protocols, it is 
clear that existing HETEE design needs to be changed. We 
consider using a multi-level bus, where the CPU and hetero- 
geneous acceleration units are connected by a bridge (HUB) 
that can be dynamically configured. Security controller is also 
integrated into the chip as a standalone system and can control 
the hub that connects the CPU to the heterogeneous unit. With 
the exception of different interconnection hub options, most 
of the rest of the HETEE design does not need to be changed. 
 
Thin TCB of trusted Linux on security controller. Building 
trusted OS on security controller requires a lot of engineering 
and research work to do. This part of the detail is beyond the 
scope of this article, and we will focus on it in the future. First, 
we need to customize the Linux kernel and delete all parts 
that are not related to task processing. Second, security mod- 
ules and security review mechanisms need to be introduced 
inside trusted OS. Specific can be learned from LSM [56], 
and SELinux [31]. Finally, we use the container mechanism 
within the trusted OS to isolate different computing tasks. At 
the same time, security controller should efficiently run Ten- 
sorFlow, CUDA, OpenCL, and a variety of drivers for kinds of 
accelerators. How to make a better trade-off between security 
and performance is one of the key tasks for the future. 
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Table 4: HETEE scalability throughput evaluation on multiple GPUs for inference tasks (For all cases with the same model and 
batch size, their throughputs are normalized to the case of baseline with 1 GPU) 
 
Model 
Batch size 16 32 64 
Number of GPU 1 GPU 2 GPUs 4 GPUs 1 GPU 2 GPUs 4 GPUs 1 GPU 2 GPUs 4 GPUs 
AlexNet 
Baseline 1.00 1.24 1.57 1.00 1.30 1.74 1.00 1.68 2.20 
HETEE 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.77 1.16 1.28 0.94 1.62 1.74 
VGG16 
Baseline 1.00 1.87 2.62 1.00 1.78 2.91 1.00 1.94 3.34 
HETEE 0.87 1.77 2.40 0.83 1.70 2.76 0.92 1.78 3.04 
GoogLeNet 
Baseline 1.00 1.35 1.61 1.00 1.41 1.87 1.00 1.35 1.89 
HETEE 0.74 0.82 0.80 0.94 1.34 1.46 0.94 1.26 1.65 
ResNet50 
Baseline 1.00 1.68 2.72 1.00 1.56 2.57 1.00 1.70 2.63 
HETEE 0.99 1.67 1.65 0.98 1.51 2.30 0.95 1.58 2.45 
ResNet101 
Baseline 1.00 1.85 3.23 1.00 1.74 2.91 1.00 1.72 2.93 
HETEE 0.99 1.81 2.56 0.95 1.62 2.71 0.99 1.65 2.70 
ResNet152 
Baseline 1.00 1.84 3.31 1.00 1.85 3.28 1.00 1.81 3.17 
HETEE 0.93 1.76 2.90 0.99 1.77 2.97 0.97 1.73 2.97 
 
6 Related Work 
 
Isolated Execution. Mainstream processor vendors have im- 
plemented TEEs in some of their chip products, such as Intel 
Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [25], AMD Secure En- 
crypted Virtualization (SEV) [24] and ARM TrustZone [3]. 
In addition, based on the concept of “open-source security”, 
Keystone [33] and Sanctum [12,32] are proposed to design 
an open-source secure enclave for RISC-V processor. These 
TEEs generally isolate a secure world from the insecure one, 
and the protected data can be processed in such secure world. 
However, none of those TEEs can truly support CDI comput- 
ing tasks which widely adopt heterogeneous architecture. For 
example, Intel SGX does not support trusted IO paths to pro- 
tect the data transmissions between enclaves and IO devices. 
Although ARM TrustZone can support trusted IO paths for 
some certain peripherals in ARM ecosystem, it is noted that 
TrustZone still does not truly support heterogeneous comput- 
ing, especially for off-chip accelerators like GPU, FPGA and 
other ASICs etc. 
Trusted paths. Graviton [53] is an architecture that supports 
trusted execution environments on GPU. It needs to modify 
the existing GPU chips via enhancing the internal hardware 
command processor. As a comparison, HETEE does not re- 
quire any changes for existing commercial CPUs or accelera- 
tor. SGXIO [55] is a generic trusted path extension for Intel 
SGX. Trusted paths are established via a dedicated trusted 
boot enclave. However, the capacity limitation of SGX en- 
clave prevent SGXIO being widely used for high-performance 
accelerators like off-chip GPU. Besides, there are several 
work which propose specific trusted paths for some certain of 
accelerators. For instance, Zhou et al. proposed a trusted path 
to a single USB device [58]. And Yu et al. demonstrated how 
to build trusted path for GPU separation [57]. Filyanov et al. 
discussed a pure uni-directional trusted path using the TPM 
and Intel TXT [17]. 
Privacy preserving deep learning. Nick Hynes et al evalu- 
ated two types secure AI computing scenes [23]. One scenario 
is to compute the entire AI workloads inside SGX enclaves. 
Obviously, this method can not achieve the efficiency of us- 
ing specific accelerators. Another scenario they evaluated 
was the Slalom solution [52], which used trusted hardware 
in tandem with an untrusted GPU. Slalom needs to decom- 
pose the AI model network into two parts, in which the upper 
control flow part runs inside the SGX enclave and is tightly 
protected, while, like convolution, matrix multiplication of 
these non-privacy-sensitive basic computations is thrown to 
untrusted GPU to accelerate computation. However, splitting 
AI networks will result in a decrease of training and inference 
accuracy. While our HETEE programming model uses a set 
of special APIs to securly encapsulate the whole AI network, 
without change the internal structure of the deep learning 
model, so that the calculation accuracy will not be affected. 
 
7 Conclusion 
Privacy-preserving techniques capable of supporting compute- 
and data-intensive (CDI) computing are important in the era 
of big data. Emerging as a more practical solution is the new 
generation of hardware supports for TEEs. However, none 
of those existing TEEs can truly support CDI computing 
tasks, due to their exclusion of high-throughput accelerators 
like GPU and TPU. This paper present the HETEE (Hetero- 
geneous TEE), the first design of TEE capable of strongly 
protecting heterogeneous computing. The proposed design en- 
ables collaborative computing units (CPU and heterogeneous 
units) to be protected under a single enclave and conveniently 
assigned across secure/insecure worlds and different enclaves. 
HETEE is uniquely constructed to work with today’s servers, 
and does not require any changes for existing computing chips. 
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It includes a security controller running on a board connected 
to the standard PCI Express (or PCIe) fabric, acting as a gate- 
keeper for a secure world dedicated to CDI computing. We 
partially implemented HETEE on the prototype system which 
is a X86 host system connected with Xilinx Zynq FPGA (act- 
ing as the security controller) and NVIDIA GPUs over PCIe 
fabric, and evaluated it with large-scale Neural Networks in- 
ference tasks. Our evaluations show that HETEE can easily 
support such secure computing tasks with acceptable perfor- 
mance overhead and exhibits good scalability when elastically 
using multiple accelerators. 
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